Morality in the Modern Communitarian Archetype

The thrust of communitarianism, as I understand it, is the assessment that we are no longer a nation-wide community, but rather we identify more closely with smaller communities based on some shared human quality, such as an ethical standpoint, pop culture appetite, linguistic distinction, and so on. Although the idea for this entry finds its genesis in a plenary session given by Michael Daxner, I have heard an identical sentiment very often in the States, and in a disturbingly increasing frequency: one man has no right to judge another, at least in part because the first does not and cannot know the circumstances of the other. I assume that in order to give the argument another figment of support, there is a tangential assertion that it is not proper or suitable for one person to judge another because that is not the charge of humans within a community or between communities. Neither of these claims holds any logical weight, not least of all because the people who hold the belief are necessarily all-purpose dunces, and I will seek to dissolve both of them with stark and abrasive force. Daxner raised several brilliant points, well-measured and finely conceived, which linked the idea of communitarianism to the practice of civil disobedience, examined the nature of morality as rooted in our self-consciousness, and then constructed a framework by which we could evaluate the legitimacy of a world court. Ubiquitous in his lecture were the themes of membership, responsibility, and judgement, which will likewise be echoed throughout this reflection.

One of the vicious dangers of communitarianism is that a system of checks is rendered execrable and, in some way, an unwelcome moral imposition. If communities are allowed to establish their own versions of morality and of law, two constructs whose differences I will attempt to outline presently, then it would be difficult to moderate which system of thought prevails in a community, and to determine how efficient and fair is that mode of action which punishes infractions. Indeed this is the crux of communitarianism, which forces a clumsy respect between communities, and more, a tacit permission for each to govern itself, based on internal laws and customs. This concept seems to be grossly incomplete, in two major ways, which confound the mind for their ignorance of the inclusions requisite to complex societies. First, communitarianism fails to acknowledge, and indeed plainly rejects the possibility of objective morality, even in cases which relate to basic efficiency. Secondly, because of the difficulty inherent in defining the boundaries--and thus the constituents--of a given community, communitarianism is a riddle whose amorphism augments the grasp of the powerful and striates the necks of the meek. It seems that if a community is defined too broadly, that is, if a community is based on something so broad as racial background but then contains several different and oppositional political ideologies, it would be impossible for every group to feel as if has a stake in leadership; the opportunity for alienation and subjugation based on ideological disagreement is obviously present, and given the non-interventionism implicit in communitarianism, that subjugation would have to be addressed internally. In simpler words, for all the cultural safety and heterogeneity that communitarianism provides, it likewise confounds the effort to assure intra-communal equality. Objectivism thus destroyed and disregarded, control is also lost, and balance is become dust.