City Lights

The newest punctuation in my life is a brand new living situation, which is fantastic and enervating in a couple of ways. I used to hate San Francisco, because I figured it was basically a confusing and intensely dirty version of San Jose. I remember feeling uncomfortable about the notion, which seemed to be more true every time I visited The City, that the rules that apply everywhere else are void anywhere on the windy peninsula. It's a strange thing to feel like your instincts are irrelevant. But now I'm comfortable with the feeling, which, as it turns out, is reducible to a much more simple, and somewhat more pleasing maxim: everyone gets to act like an adult, and eclectic is encouraged.

The paramount example of that attitude is located about sixteen man-sized steps from my front door, and is actually much closer than that: the window that opens into my living room exposes the upper hill and playground of Dolores Park, the stoic jewel of the Mission District. Fifteen square blocks of rolling green, freckled with palm trees and a footer of basketball courts, are the most attractive option I have found for any day that needs filling. Everything is relaxed there: the attitude, the pace, the rules, the music that flows from novelty stereos and the tin drums of whoever is paddling away. A woman waddles by our strewn-about blanket, offering tamales. A man visits later, selling pot truffles. Old men with cheeks like the palm of a baseball glove collect recyclables and stuff them into muddy burlap sacks. A whiffleball game has started on the south hill, and a speck of plastic lofts across the 74 degree sky. The world teems here, but calmly, and on its own. Time seems to skirt away fluidly, while we lie under the sun and cars flit down the curvy streets lining the park. The earth bumps underneath our ripped cotton comforter, conversation snapshots dance themselves along the wind, and you can fall asleep before you stop smiling.

A Heartbreaking Work

The decision which was made on May 26th by the California Supreme Court was in every way a concussion to the hope that I have for my future. The decision to uphold Proposition 8, passed in November of last year by a 5% margin, was extremely divisive. I can remember the intense despair that many of my friends and I felt, not because it hampered our ability to marry, but because it spoke so poorly of the tolerance common to the meagerly rational electorate. My view of that degree of hateful discrimination was, as it is ever more, simply this: I cannot bear the thought that so many people who are so bad at thinking are given so much power.

For me, ethical decisions are almost entirely logical processes which, while frequently stressing because of their ability to produce several rationally supported answers, are at the very least justified, arguable on some basis common to opponents, and amenable to scrutiny and revision. I will revisit this point often in this blog entry, in the debates which will inevitably follow it, and indeed throughout my life, owing to the maddening insistence of a worldview that almost any pain is a better option than intellectual numbness. The first part of my criticism stems from the way that people voted on the initial ballot; it is an issue of predictability. Deplorably, the voter data speaks volumes about the way in which lifestyle, not logic, informs the way that people vote.* I thought that in the supreme court, a body whose title trumpets the gravity of its purpose, there must be a tendency to get it right. In other words, I do not have confidence that any random majority will choose the right thing most of the time, but I do hope that a trained and rigorous council of experts will do just that. Today, that sentiment is proved worthless.

Briefly, for those of you who have not had time to read the public content the 6-1 majority decision, or about any of the defenses for either side, here is an unbiased recapitulation of the reason that the appeal was denied. After Proposition 8 was passed, the opponents to the proposition alleged that the vote amounted to a revision, which necessitates that two-thirds of the legislature rule in favor of its ratification. The corollary of this argument is that the law which would be enacted as a result of passing Proposition 8 is not simply an amendment to the state constitution, and therefore not available to the public to decide based on opinion. It is inaccurate, although understandable given the intense frustration prompted by the CASC decision, to suggest that the court ruled that a ban on same-sex marriages is constitutional. In fact, they have done the opposite of this only last year, whereupon over 18,000 same-sex couples were legally married. Rather, the CASC ruled first, in 2008, that marriage should extend to same-sex couples, and has ruled now, in 2009, that the public does indeed have a right to vote that it wants an amendment to the state constitution which would disallow this sort of union. Attorney General Jerry Brown also asserted in his appeal that the proposition would violate a Californian citizen's right to privacy, and that it rescind an inalienable right. The CASC flatly denied both of these appeals, stating simply: "No authority supports the attorney general's claim."

I say categorically that if you have voted in favor of Proposition 8, if you do favor its sentiment, or if you support the efforts of anti-appeal campaigns in that vein, I have an overwhelming and unmatched disdain for your position. There are many opinion-related matters in a wide variety of fields in which I may oppose a certain view in the argument for which I can see some sort of merit. That is to say, it is absolutely the case that I have disagreements with people, but I can almost always see that my opponent has some reasoning. Gay marriage is one instance which is not governed by this general rule of understanding. In my research of the initial proposition and of the recent court decision, I have encountered dozens of criticisms of gay marriage and of the position supporting gay marriage. Every tiny word of it is nonsense, and wholly unsupportable by any mind with the slightest portion of decency, modesty, or honesty. Not only do I firmly revile the desire to ban gay marriage, but I can see absolutely no evidence to support the assertion that is it either ethically supportable or utilitarian. The anti-gay marriage position is small, it is disgusting, and it embarrasses me every last second that it is allowed to be propagated.

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*According to the raw data collected and aggregated by the Sacramento Bee following the poll results, those most keen to vote to restrict the legality of gay marriage were: Republican or conservative (82/85%), black (70%) or Hispanic (53%), Protestant (65%), Catholic (64%), a high school graduate (56%), older than 30 (55% for voters 30-44; 54% for voters 45-64; and 61% for voters 65 and older), gun owners (62%), supportive of the war in Iraq (85%), and supportive of Bush's policies and presidency (86%). According to the same data, those who voted to support the gay right to marriage were: registered Democrats, independents, or liberals (64/54/78%), white or Asian (51%), non-religious (90%), and post-graduate students (60%). Interestingly, 61% of the people who voted YES on Proposition 8 also said that race was a factor for their vote in the Presidential election.

Someone Should Be Studying These Things

I bet that it would make a good book to collect the bizarre stuff that people think about, and to just have someone clean up the grammar and structure a little bit. I should think that it would be rather nice to wake up on a Sunday, say, around 2pm (as is my custom on Sunday mornings, Saturday mornings, and other mornings when the Giants do not play an afternoon game) and to eat a turkey sandwich, lazily thumbing in and out of some guy's pointless thoughts. It must be at least half-interesting to some of you: after all, you're reading this. And it would obviously be better if you had that turkey sandwich.

Spying on Whales
I begin with the premise that for all the advances that we have made in our study of the myriad species on our strange planet, sometimes our technology is too powerful to be useful. On several occasions, I have seen marine biologists on television, zipping their UltraWhite Smile boats through the Pacific. They drop down their scanners and dials, their cone-shaped sonar dishes and their cooing sonic mechanisms, and they start pulsating coded messages to all the whales in proximity. They're talking, and hoping to hear back. I'm not sure what sort of research is being done by these trials. I do not consider myself an expert on whale conversation, but I thought that we knew pretty much all we really needed to about whale habits. They swim up and down the coast depending on the weather, they eat krill, and they have heroic battles with giant squid the size of space shuttles. Case closed, I figured, but damned if you can't find some guy with a patchy beard and a whole bunch of pockets who wants to sail for a living. Onwards with the funding, then, to invent all these fancy gadgets that let us chirp to whales.

The weird part is, they answer back, these lumbering giants with their bathtub faucet heads. A couple flirtatious, mechanical blips, and these whales quip back with as much undersea gossip as the scientists can haul in and--get this--interpret. Because, you may ask, what good is doing the work if you cannot figure out what the things are saying? I have no idea how this sort of translation is done. I suspect, and now with even more evidence, that we have found an aquatic Rosetta Stone, and those swarthy marine biologists are just keeping it a secret. I have suspected this for years, in fact, and I suppose that it is the exact reason that Porter Ricks was able to understand Flipper; how else, after all, are we to believe this was possible? And good, I say. Otherwise, both Coral Key Park and Marine Preserve and mid-1960s television programming would have been all the worse for it.

How strange it is that we spy on whales? It is probably no weirder than the fact that I am into a third paragraph of writing about it. But there are two particular things in this whole matter that stick out to me. First, I cannot think of any other animal, with the obvious exception of other human beings, that spy on one another, across species or within a species. So, it seems to be that we are the only animals that have a system for recording and interpreting the conversations that other animals have with each other and with our own computers. When you think about it, it is probably a good thing that other animals really do not concern themselves with these sort of trivialities. Only the species that has NASCAR commemorative KFC buckets could invest in whale translation as a profession. Second, I am not sure that I can say, with confidence, that I could never imagine myself in the topsiders of that sailor. There are only a few things left that are a total mystery to us, but have the prospect of being comforting anyway. I can imagine being that lonely scientists, floating askance on a choppy emerald ocean, dropping six-hundred foot of steel cable into the deep, and waiting. Maybe you get a booming sigh back, and you have company somewhere under the unimaginable blueness. Talking to whales may be the intersect of a Venn diagram which addresses things that are magical and things that are scientific.

Real Trust
Actually, when you look at how we generally act towards one another, we probably should not trust airline pilots half as much as we do. Here are the facts. I have probably taken 100 plane flights in my life, and likely more than that, the majority of those having come in the past four years. Each time, my routine is the same: I guard against boredom and people with the cunning use of an iPod, I bring with me several books which I never read, I buy a tremendous wealth of candy for the flight, and I board a several-ton flying bus to be guided in a parabola across the planet by a man I will never meet. This man now has the ability to kill me. But I get on the plane, I clickwheel over to Wilco or Belle and Sebastian or Sufjan Stevens, and I rack out with my face pressed against the plexiglass, nary a thought for the 'morrow. There is no other time in life when we are required to trust so much, given so little. Why do we do it, and without paying this relationship any attention? I think it has to be basically the same mindset which governs our collective respect for Zorro.

What I mean to say is, it seems that we can reasonably infer that if someone is wearing a mask, he's either a hero or a madman. The allure of what is not seen--and therefore, what could potentially be--is enough to inspire confidence in a masked avenger, and is likewise sufficient to bolster our terror of a sheathed lunatic. I think the mask somehow convinces us that our initial opinion is right. And if in cinema, then why not in person? We get a great deal of what we imagine life to be like from the print we read or the films we see, so this bit of transposition is not too big of a stretch. Every girl I have ever dated seems to want, from me, some version of John Cusackitude: so this mask idea might as well have some merit. Someone has entrusted a man with the responsibility to fly a jumbo-sized tuna can through the troposphere--he even gets little uniform accessories, if he's good enough--and if he is mostly an unknown to his passengers, that may actually be calming. The pilot even has the benefit of that speaker system, by which he can, through his trademark drone and slogans, reassure everyone in the cabin that he knows what he's doing and that everyone can go ahead and relax. If I knew that Spiderman was really that spazzy little chemistry student from Empire State University, there's no way I would let him dive off a roof to try to catch me (and by me, I mean whatever chick is playing MJ). But because I don't know who he is, I just trust the mask. I listen to his voice. And I go about my day.

Broken Wheel

"Our Great War is a spiritual war. Our Great Depression is our lives."
Chuck Palahniuk

About two weeks ago, my knee betrayed me. I have no job, and I have no dependable schedule, so I am clothed in the evils of idleness. I do nothing all day which acts as evidence that I have existed that day. I make sandwiches, I ride my bike, I watch and listen to podcast debates, and I do one-legged pushups on the floor of a cramped bedroom. In the case that I had entered a time machine and I was concerned about irreversibly altering the future by polluting the past, this is the sort of life I would have to life in order to make sure that I affect nothing. Twelve days whipped by like the leaves of a flipbook, and I have made nothing with them. I hope that I do not have to experience this fate, but if it happens that I am one day lain in bed and around me are gathered the people I love, it is possible that I will look back on days like these have been and think to myself, there is no limit to what I would give to have those days back for the doing. I should crumple up the time I waste and shoot it at the wire basket next to my desk, like so much paper that is issued from the hands of writers who are obsessed with--and constantly motivated by--attempting to produce things of merit. I am often one of these; I have not been, recently, and my mood has soured noteably as a consequence.

For the emotional price I have paid by way of this lassitude, I have accrued quite a bit intellectually. I have watched or listened to something north of 20 debates and lectures, mostly revolving around the topics of religion, international human rights policy, or freedom of speech and press. I wish I could record the massive amount of thinking that I've done about these topics as a result of the impressive discourse, but sometimes the density of the material, combined with my poor organizational skills when I'm so furious with ideas, makes it impossible to summon order, especially among the interlacing topics. Here is a very brief list of the blogs which could come as a result of my only best use of time during my convalesence. My hope is that I will be able to turn this attrocious negative into something of a positive and productive experience, although my mood tonight, which is typical of how it has been most of the week, usually fosters either vitriol which I am sad to have thought or slop which I am embarrassed to have written. Intellectually and emotionally, then, it is obvious that I have good reason to resolve both my attitude and my body, but both of them are slow-going and neither mechanism cares much about my preference for not being ill.

1. Something comprehensive about my view on the role of religion in the world. This will easily be several essays, both perscriptive and descriptive. Specific topics needs to include dogmatism of any kind, the role and import of conversation, and the stricture that religion places around the neck of the global struggle to establish and ensure human rights. In each of these instances, I'm not sure that I can manage to reduce away the terrible fear I have about the way in which history will judge the time in which I lived.

2. Something about the terrible legacy of quarreling and antagonism beset upon us by the last administration, and the events that took place in its duration. I cannot listen to a single news telecast or talking heads show anymore without wondering what percentage of the truth I'm hearing. I very regularly hear two people say opposite things about the same event or person, so I believe there is one of two things happening. Either one or both of the people is wrong, or one or both of the people is lying. In either case, the quality and quantity of information to which I have access is depressing; the horrid clumsiness of intellectual pursuit confounds me every single day of my too short life. Should I have to constantly figure out whether or not I am receiving the truth, and how much of it? How can there be partisan news? Why can I not rely on something to just relate one small set of facts in a row? Nothing could be goddamned easier than this, and none of you will do it: you must taint everything. Well this is the world we have, because of it.

3. A short story I am working on about a man whose birth date had been confused.

4. A social contract theory for backpackers.

5. There is a Tennessee Williams quote that goes like this: "Why do I write? Because I found life to be unsatisfactory." So, something about that.

6. One of my primary historical interests, and political interests for that matter, is revolution. I have begun working on a short essay, informed by the ideology present in the entry about Dublin, that revolution must be non-violent in order to be successful.


Oh, to be able to travel again.

Adriaddicts

11 April 2009. Saturday.

We had one more gelato before we left Split, but you can hardly hold it against us. The lemon flavor was transcendent: we have talked about it several times since we left, and we have conducted several comparative experiments since. It is a serious business, this ice cream sampling, or at least we have made a habit of pretending that it is.

Zipping down the Croatian coast, we stared out the windows as the scenery whirred past us. North of Bosnia, most of the landscape is truly picturesque: the crags are gnarled and gumdrop purple, and peppered with dark, feathery trees. The fields on both sides of the road are rich with these boulders until about 150km south of Split, when the small clusters of rocks give way to impressive mountains with striations of grape crops. The ridges in the east cut across the sky like the edge of construction paper after a pass with those rifled designer scissors. The juxtaposition of the Croatian ranges augments the beauty of the horizon, which turned thirty shades of blue as encroached on Bosnia.

It was time for a swim around 14:30, so we hopped off the coastal road and parked on the top of a hill that overlooked a solid rock beach. Once again without a plan, we sauntered down the choppy hill, leaping from pathway to amorphous pathway in order to reach the rocks 100m below us.We were assailed on several occasions by these large winged insects that looked quite a lot like clothespins. There were no snakes in the hill, but our suspicion that there may be was still elevated enough to make us test every footstep we took before we committed, as if the ground we were stepping on had the potential to be extremely hot, and we kept having to make sure.

Arriving on the rocks was only the first challenge we faced that day. We tested out the shards of coral that lined the shore, trying to determine whether or not they were stable, first, and moreover, whether it would kill our feet to use these as our diving boards. After toeing the water a bit, and bemoaning how much of a shock jumping off would be, we charged boldly into the fray: and yeah, it was chilly. I recall yelping. The water was crisp and a strong light blue, the way you would imagine glacier water to be. We could see maybe 10m down, so we were sure that we in no danger of hitting the bottom. The danger came from a less conspicuous source: the treacherous sea urchins which punctuate the coast like pindots on an Italian silk tie. After our third dive, Adam swam back to shore and clung to the vertical-pancake rocks, scooping his feet towards the platform just under the wave break. I immediately heard a chirp to my left, and saw Adam scoot backwards, wincing: SHARP, he yelped. Shark? No no, sharp! Agghhh!

Back up on the shore, it looked like we had gotten away safely. Three half-inch spikes jutted out of the sole of his right foot, near his pinky toe. Quickly plucking them out and dispatching them into the Adriatic, Adam brushed his foot and examined again. We discovered another 20 smaller spines buried deeper under the skin, only grapite pencil dots now, after the pressure of walking around on the rocks. Over the next couple of hours, and after our arduous hike back up the hill, we efforted to extract as many of the bastards as possible. About 15 still remain, but the pain has greatly subsided. Adam has been an incredible sport about the whole thing, insisting that he can hike with us all day, and leading the initiative to jump of some of the higher cliffs that we have found in Croatia. His pain has, to some immeasurable extent, been abated by a traditional Croatian remedy for sea urchin wounds: an olive oil wrap for three nights consecutive, which is meant to coax the spines from the skin and to numb the skin sufficiently to bear the pain of walking around.

Onwards we sped, then, towards Bosnia, which was an anti-climactic episode: we had truly hoped to receive a stamp at the border, but our passports were not even inspected. Once again, we are victims of the pain often faced by three modestly dressed middle-class white males. When will the prejudices end? Just around the bend from Bosnia, the crayon box of Dubrovnik is visible straightaway. The coast is decorated with houses and beset with very small motor boats for short-term skips between the twelve hundred islands just to the west. We matriculated into the city and found some provisions for the night, located our hostel, and ascended the stairs to down our welcome drinks. In small chalice-type shot glasses, the man who owns the property served us a honey liquor made with grapes from Croatia. To us, and no one else, we said.

After some warm-up exercises on the hostel patio, we ripped into Old Town. Along for the ride is a lovely French Canadian girl called Stephanie, who has been here for several days and had already received a tour of the city. We sliced through the castle walls which were modest and beautiful, and dotted with bullet holes. The ramparts are entirely lit in a muddled orange light, so the entire castle looks haunted and ancient. But just below them, the Easter parties raged with great fervor, especially at the gay bar and the pub just next to it. The chair cushions here were purple and pink and orange, cow-print and leopard-print, fluffy and welcoming. We had travarice, several more pints, and some pretty intense laughs about our surroundings. The end of the night wrapped up with a compliment about my shorts–or shirt, depending on how you interpret the accent–a lesson about Croation pop music, an interjection about Michelle Obama, a Facebook request, an ironic hi-bye interchange across the way from the parking lot, and a great deal of fatigue. Good morning, Dubrovnik.

12 April 2009. Easter Sunday.

Religion: the enemy of commerce. It turns out that there are no shops open on Easter, which we knew, but that there are no…things…open either. This set a fantastic opportunity to go to Lokrum, the island about 4km from Dubrovnik. Of course, to prepare us for the journey, we felt that one more helping of gelato would probably be a wise investment. Lemon, please.

A 40kn boatride later, we rolled into the docks in front of Lokrum’s park, and were greeted by some shrill coos from the peacocks housed there. The F.K.K. awaited us, so we veered north around the island and found ourselves on a rude beach made of enormous boulders and canyons. Water sucked into the alleys between the sunning spots, spraying our feet and misting the air. We skipped the beach. Around the bend and totally secluded, we found a natural cove with the clearest water I have ever known. It was a 50 meter expanse made of blue marbles, at least 30m deep and pummeled by waves. Cliff diving, ladies and gentlemen.

We, uh. We..don't know.

8 April 2009. Wednesday.

The day started off a bit later than we had supposed it would, mostly for the reason that we had failed to account for our propensity to screw around for inexplicably lengthy periods of time. One of our favorite pre-departure diversions was a mashup game of soccer and baseball, which ended with a sharp line drive into the middle of the lake, and a failed attempt to rangle the errant ball with a bit of a lakeside branch. We were not fazed, and were indeed encouraged by the advent of a particular finding: nutella and bread from the Schloss kitchen. We also took three packets of jam.

Just before we left Salzburg, I suggested that Adam and I might give our manual car a try. After all, having grown up in the States, we were relatively new to the idea that driving could not be done whilst eating a cheeseburger and texting for sports scores, and that one should indeed need to pay attention to shifting gears and tapping a troublesome third pedal. Right around the time that the clutch started to sound like someone was running a roll of quarters through a paper shredder, I decided to switch spots with Daniel and let him drive the ten total hours to Split, bisected on our first night by a short rest in Rijeka. Having thus ceded the driver’s seat, I took up the passenger spot, and Adam sprawled in the spacious (read: miniscule) backseat. He and he alone was to be the guardian of our snack cache, which was comprised largely of the sorts of things that mothers get mad at their kids for eating too much of when they’re 7.

Our plan was to have left by 2pm RST. Given the gracious buffer between our planned time and our probable time, our 8:06pm departure was about half an hour early. We commended ourselves by eating Austria’s version of the Gala apple, a pink and sunburst-yellow beauty of a fruit which, while it lacks crunch, is nonetheless the size of a softball and was thus sufficient for our dinners. Onwards then, we sped towards Hallein and Villach and Lublijana, making good time and fighting back the stinging urges to sleep. We were sustained by 80s rock, several Beatles discs, window breeze bursts, and open-ended questions.

Daniel was a bit sick, so we decided to blitz to Rijeka and knock out in a hostel. Yeah, it’s that easy, we thought: navigate to a country which we have never seen or studied, linguistic fluency for which we do not possess, a map for which we do not have, and with zero idea about how to locate a place to sleep. Foolproof, yeah? We thought so. Well, the darndest thing happened, to tell you the truth: we ended up on a one-way street between a shipyard and an abandoned garage, small matchbox cars zipping past us, staring at an insufficient GPS tracker, and confronting groups of teenaged Croatians about the direction of a suitable hostel. Each of these is a circumstance which is, on its own, less than desirable: together, they are at least formidable, and when it’s 6 degrees outside and you’re wearing madras shorts, they’re nearly unbearable.The young man who offered us directions while the other chatted in Croatian was pleasant enough, but he had an extremely low opinion of the district:

Daniel: We are looking for this place, the Hostel Rijeka.

Croatian: What’s the..why do you come to this shithole town called Rijeka?

Daniel: We, uh. We..don’t know. But we would like to sleep.

Croatian: Yes, that is the good thing to do here.

We plodded down a graffiti-checked street to the hostel which we’d discovered, and then to another, because the poor man’s Rivers Cuomo who ran the hostel said that he was completely booked. Three hostel options later, we decided to park in the lot adjacent to a small lodge off the highway, and to contort ourselves in such a way that sleeping became possible, although not familiar.

The sun comes.

9 April 2009. Thursday.

The next part of our marathon journey started omniously: a bottle of John Jameson Irish Whiskey was left outside the car during our morning tooth brushing session, representing our first casualty of the trip. It will surely be accompanied, although we will try our hardest to make sure that this is not the case (so far we have been successful in this regard, having cleanly polished each soviet red can of the pint cases which we buy daily). Point in fact, there were many ominous symbols on the way to Split, which became our destination on Thursday night when we figured out that Dubrovnik was farther to the south than our wafer cookies would last us.

First, on the side of the road around kilometer 278, there was a massive fire in the center of a rocky expanse to the west. The plume billowed out across the rocks as if it had no origin whatever, but instead engendered itself from amidst the ruby stones and tilted huts which polka-dotted the Croatian landscape. It rose maybe 70 meters in there air, and eclipsed the sun when we laced back towards the coast, temporarily darkening the road ahead. We speculated that it may have something to do with the Easter festival which is taking place this weekend in the devoutly religious country. None of us being a particularly religious man, we did not have any way to justify this supposition, but we felt satisfied, and we celebrated our detective victory with a bit of a baguette which we had bought before leaving Salzburg.

Arriving in Split was simply the first of our tasks before finding the hostel which we had reserved for the night. Our GPS navigator, which we refer to exclusively as “TomTom,” lead us in concentric circles and mobius strips for not less than an hour an a quarter, before we found our site: Silver Center Hostel, affixed just in between the main square of the town and the sleepy marina to the south. The place is on the second floor of one of the set pieces that is used in Saving Private Ryan: an entirely cement building, the ground floor of which is home to a pile of thirty lunchpail-sized oblong stones, broken wall lamps, deteriorating stairs, and exposed electrical wires. On the second floor, we found ourselves in the middle of a delightfully confined makeshift hostel, four rooms and twenty-six beds in total, with the nicest hosts you can imagine.

This city is a very nice one indeed, but it gives you the impression that it is constanly undergoing an identity crisis. It is as if the entire port is the product of a architectural equivalent of some culinary experiment in which Roman columns and facades were thrown into a salad spinner alongside modern docks, cabanas, cafes, and promenades. The resultant city is our lovely Split, whose name fairly accurately reflects the personality of its scenery. It’s a strange thing to swerve through the cobbled streets and to see tagged walls across from massive designer shopping malls, question marks and famous faces painted all over the place, like a city-wide public art display.

10 April 2009. Friday.

We did a bit of the ocean today. About a kilometer to the southeast, Split’s only sand beach is the playground of the speedo-clad and muscle-bound. On this eyelash of a sandbar, they play this game with a little racquetball which roughly resembles catch, except that no one ever catches the ball; or volleyball, except that no one erected a net; or dancing, except that someone brought a racquetball. Adam and I ventured into the ocean while Daniel tuned out on the beach. We had shuffled about 80 paces into the sea, and the water took its time to creep slowly past our knees. Adam, the more courageous, heaved himself into the water as I riffed “Final Countdown,” and I doused my head in the tepid crystal clear water. Back to the shore we strode, kicking the water which started to slink back towards our ankles. On the shore, we played question games as we fell asleep in the afternoon sun: if you had to pick a president to come with us on the trip, who would you choose?
Jackson. Eisenhower. Teddy Roosevelt, we said. Daniel wants Senator Joseph McCarthy, for meddlesome reasons..

This Is What a Travel Journal Looks Like

I have heard from a couple of people, most notably and persistently my mother, that she figured that this blog would be more of a journal about traveling. It has become something very different from that: right now, it isn't much more than a portfolio. So, for the six people who have ever read this blog, and principally for my mother:

Alright, already. Here it is. Dublin, Amsterdam, and Marseille.

My City Tour

Dublin Blues

I have always had reservations about caring for people, or maybe ‘difficulty’ is a better word for it. It seems to me that some folks just flatly do not appeal to me, or that maybe I am acting in self-interest in not expanding myself too broadly. I have always been better at keeping a close group of friends who are very dear to me, and quite a bit worse at keeping up very many relationships at once. Maybe a part of it is, I feel like I am able to be more of a part of my family if it is relatively small.

I care for cities in sort of the same way. Whenever I travel anywhere, I sort of identify with some part of the city I visit which is in a small way the same as I come to love a friend. Dublin is one of the chief representatives of the group of places for which I care very deeply, at it has been for several years, since the epic union. There is something about the way that the roads there are built, that the people cover up with their collars, that the bars push out string music. Dublin has a unique quality for me, which combines the fantastic and modern with a quaint and noble past. I wince when I think about the way in which cities in the States could never be this way, and moreover how the people are just not designed for it to carry the kind of charm that pulses in Ireland. The sadness here, which I cannot separate from even my fondest thoughts of a nation, is that sometimes the city that you love rips into you in the same way that a person can.

The latest round of political action in Ireland is largely divisive and tremendously violent. Several of the splinters of the Irish Republican Army have taken responsibility for shootings which have rippled through the country over the past couple of months. These attacks, which take place largely in Protestant communities, are being forged against the members of opposing religious factions, and especially against members of the garda or other representatives of the state.

I can understand the appeal of rebellion and of uprising, and even of widespread and enduring angst. I very often fell the desire to react in a more extreme manner towards an opposition which seems to me to be domineering and mislead, including having my interests far from its focus. I cannot tell how often I have my most extreme emotional reactions to these very relationships: it is rage, and frustration, and restlessness, and contempt, and it has to burn itself out every time I get to thinking. In all cases, it seems to me that the problems that I face, when laid against the problems which brew between Irish factions, are not close in duration or in degree. However, I do identify with the climate and the emotion, and my complaint is this: why is war your solution, my rebel brothers? I cannot imagine a world in which one group can strong arm another and produce a better world as a result.

Now, I can conceive that a person or a group could be a rightful or desired winner, and that that group can dispatch an evil or maleficent one. Surely this must be the case, from time to time, or even very often. But the strain which is persistent is the foolish and dangerous axiom that violence solves problems, and any instance in which this is true simply propagates a world in which the eil group continues to persist, and for the very reason that others were defeated. Groups which lose wars of ideology do not go away when they are put down. Indeed they are emboldened by the idea that they might have success the next time if only they can be even more lethal, and how can this breed a better people?

This taste for distaste is a terrible thing, and the worst bit of it, philosophically speaking, is that it works if you look only at each case individually: you see a victory and a loss, and this is a normal thing in any contest. In the loss, of course, you can see shame, or guilt, or anger, and there is a regrouping effect after it. In the victor, you see thrill or relief, ego, and sometimes you are thankful for that party who fought and who succeeded. But you never hear the airy peal of the violins. You see the bundled up street crowds glance away from each other, and the stones in the cobbled streets look just a little more cracked, dirty, and farther apart.

I Amsterdam

We all know the exploits of the political scene in Amsterdam. The social allowances, lets say, such as the government sanctioned sex trade and the relaxed rules on drug enforcement. These and other norms are famous among travelers my age, and are indeed most of the reason that anyone I've met along my way is interested in visiting the city. And fine: it seems that the Red Light and the coffee shops are tremendously popular for the locals just as well as the tourists, very likely for the reason that there is no great hang-up about either of those earthly delights. Both of these practices are freely viewed and, in fact, smelled. Actually, it is marginally difficult for an unfamiliar wanderer of the city to choose just a regular coffee shop instead of one which purveys drugs, and in some districts, the windows go dresses-dresses-shoes-chicks-purses.

At home, you get two kinds of people, basically. One sort will call himself "morally and ethically opposed"--whatever that means--about the sorts of liberties that Amsterdam boasts. The other is into both of of those trades, and is in favor of them really because he'd like it to be easier for him to have access to sex and drugs. I find it difficult to blame the second guy. But there is a better reason to support such liberalism: the city works perfectly. The violent crime rate is extraordinarily low, especially compared to our land of the self-proclaimed free. It is wonderfully clean, and more than that, it is beautiful and manicured with rolling hills and lawns. The people are friendly, giant, extremely well-educated, and distractingly good looking. There are more bikes in Amsterdam than prayers in the Vatican, and the whole nation is one of the world leaders of the environmentally conscious movement. The public transit is safe, and logical, and efficient--look, the whole place is pristine. Every adult is allowed to behave as if he were an adult, and they do with a much higher frequency than they do in the Silicon Valley. The economy also benefits tremendously, as does the populace, I would imagine, from the industries which are strictly maligned in the States. But why are they? They clearly do not hurt the morale or the general spirit: everyone here is extremely gracious and openly welcoming. The quality of the education and the intellect of the average Dane are certainly not lacking: everyone I have met speaks Dutch and perfect English, and very frequently either German or French or both. Interestingly, the most notable negative wave I am aware of in Amsterdam is one that is made possible by their overarching principle of understanding: religious fundamentalism, which indeed conflicts with and forbids the famed practices of the city, is certainly the leading cause of violent crime in the region.

The only regrettable facet of the culture which I have internalized is, how terrifically impossible it would be for our nation to adopt anything like this. The amount and persuasion of tolerance that the States offers is absolutely absurd: it is the truest definition of an illusion to announce that we are founded upon an emphasis on civil rights and liberties and that we live up to this credo. Each European city I have been in, including Amsterdam, has been an occasion for a conversation about the invasive extent of the American legal system. Is that not shocking enough? Students from other countries are aware of and concerned by the degree to which the United States restrict practices and views which they commonly view to be inalienable, or the way in which it similarly mandates things which are so obviously inane and unnecessarily complicated. We permit very little, I have come to realize; we are decades behind many countries' efforts to extend rights to citizens and, notably, their environmental practices. We are laden with war and fundamentalism, shouting and emotional outbursts, celebrity gossip rags and dating trivia. The daft is the easy, is the accepted, is the appreciated. This unfortunate link makes progressive liberty not only absent, it makes it impossible.

Marseille

This place sparkles like San Francisco, and it smells pretty similar too. I can never quite find my way around by way of actual street familiarity, as I am eventually able to do even in towns which are short-lived. Instead, in Marseille as in San Francisco, I generally point myself in the direction of the thing I am looking for, and move that way until I find a landmark or, better, a sign. The streets are polka-dotted with gum and cigarettes, and the homeless population is as abundant, aggressive, and aimlessly talkative. The attitude in the street here is much the same as in The City. There is a sort of funky vibe to the younger Marseillais, but mixed with a feeling like they or their fathers are very reliably in the fishing trade. There are lots of knit, handmade-looking clothes here. Wide-cable knit sweaters, scarves, ill-fitting dresses which look trendy or messy depending on how cute the girl is. It's the sort of place where there are tons of shops, but not many stores. Everything looks to be makeshift and humble, as if the actual buildings are hand-me-downs.

The harbor beams. It is packed with boats which are worked on and loaded and cleaned and inspected every day, while the gulls oversee the activity. The city appears to have two suns; one of them lives under the ocean and blasts through the surface of the water as long as his skyward brother keeps him company. Cafes and boutiques are everywhere, so there is a lot of plate clinking and soft paper flitting. The breeze rips everyone in the city and pushes them through the hilly streets and along the winding coastline.

Spoken Word

The core session on the role of translation began today. The keynote speech was given by Esther Allen of PEN World Voices New York, who hazarded several challenges about the current state and future of translation. I have virtually no experience in the subject at the moment, but the speech was extremely interesting for its first allusion. In order to tease out the genesis of the problem of translation, Allen called upon the story of Nimrod, whose frustrated appearance in Inferno rouses a harsh scold from Virgil the intellectual. Nimrod is the giant who conceptualized the Tower of Babel, a mutiny which, as the legend goes, rendered the world pluralingual. The punishment that he suffers in hell is noncommunicability; he is unable to understand anybody, is likewise unable to be understood, and rails against his misfortune by belting thunderclap blasts on a tremendous horn. Allen's relation illustrated the lesson that often, this is the very dilemma-turned-paradox that many linguists constantly face: some pieces, for all their nuance and organic beauty, are impossible to translate properly, and still others are so vivid and common to the human experience that they do not require any translation at all.

This dichotomy underscores a principle point, as far as I can tell, about the objection many might have about the nature of translation. Allen notes that an enduring feeling amongst the academic community is that the new work is necessarily of a different, perhaps lesser quality or merit than the original, because it is impossible to put the original author's whole meaning into equivalent foreign words. Additionally, the translator's interpretation of the content of the text is just as prone to misunderstanding at it would be if any reader attempted the original, and it is difficult establish definitively whether a particular translator or reader has provided a version which is more convincing than another. But this idea seems to be more incomplete, the more correct it is. If it is so that language, experience, worldview, and other aspects of culture are so ingrained in the translator and his language that even so skilled a wordsmith loses the original beauty of the text, it cannot be too far of a step to imagine that an average reader in the original language also experiences a novel, an essay, a piece of poetry, or indeed a speech, song, movie or sitcom through this same sort of corrupting lens; it is a non sequitur to condemn translation, because this problem of misunderstanding is common to anyone's experience of any piece of art. If we extrapolate this point, then each great piece of literature has a qualitative deficiency that is proportionate to the amount of diversity in the society which reads it: the more differences between the author and the readership, the higher the likelihood that the piece is going to be misunderstood. Thus, it appears as if literary translators would not necessarily introduce anything corrupt by way of their art that an average reader would not introduce anyway; the specific problem that a translator might contribute seems to be a slightly different one.

At this point, it should be mentioned that the entire argument I am making is inextricable from my belief that in many pieces of literature, the author intends to present a specific message or set of messages; this is an easily disputable issue, and I would imagine that especially among literary translators, the opinion that literature is made even more vibrant with every new reading of the work is equally contended. The problem here is semantic: if literary translation is an art, then it must be referred to as a science just as well, at least in terms of the words used to describe it qualitatively. Regarding a poem or a mathematical proof or a touchdown pass, one could use any one of the synonyms of beauty; but for a translation, this is not so. If a translation is called something like beautiful, it seems to me that this is either a misnomer or a bad thing. When a reader calls a translation beautiful, he could actually mean that the text he is reading is beautiful, or, in other words, that if the translation is accurate (a tenuous word in itself), then the original work is beautiful, and that the translation reflects the quality of the original work. To be reductionist, we might instead say that the translation is good, and that the original work is the one that is beautiful. Alternatively, if the reader truly means to deem the translation itself beautiful, it seems to me that that adjective might support the charge that translation is an intrinsically flawed practice: if beautiful is accurate, that one word represents the dissolution of the original author's voice by highlighting the presence and skill of the translator. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it does act as sort of an asterisk for the new piece, which is to say that it should be read as a translation which is additionally a commentary, which may very likely be intentional.

Perhaps we should rather abide by the vocabulary that is more commonly associated with science, not art, both in terms of a goal and an evaluative metric. Of course it is possible for a translation project to look more like a work of art, because these projects seem to be more exercises than assignments. We learned today that there is an author in the States who is taking all the English versions of Comedia, and making a unified English translation of all of those first translations. There was a similarly playful work published in the recent past, in which the dialect was that of rural 19th century Australia. Examples such as these are clearly in a different category from traditional translations, and they more easily fit into the artistic category: the voice of the translator, or some distinct skill that he possesses, is unmistakable. But to bring this same voice to all translated works would, I think, be a tremendous disservice to the canon of second-language works. There is something to be said for those types of creative productions; but also worthy of merit are the translations which intentionally pursue a very precise translation of the words contained in the original text, which may allow a foreign reader insight into the literary technique of the place and period; and further still, equally valuable are the productions which are not necessarily word-for-word transcriptions, but instead are themeatically identical, and would therefore consider a sort of cultural translation as well as a lingual one. If the practice of performing only beautiful translations is instituted, it is plain to see how quickly the closest version of the original work would be a forgotten pursuit; we would be incalculably worse off for it.

On the Practical Irrelevance of the God Question

One of my principle interests in philosophy, besides logic and ethics, is the very human struggle with ontology. There is no need to delineate the tremendous bulk of speculation about the manner and conditions of our existence, which can be plainly identified in even the oldest texts and oral traditions. I can see the way in which this question of our origin is an enticing one, a useful one to answer, and even a challenge to the brilliant minds which, should they conclude something fantastic about ontology, would be immortalized in the sparse canon of genius. But along with the limitless inquiry has come an equally immeasurable amount of disagreement, which has over the past several thousand years bordered on vitriolic. This is intolerable.

I have heard a dozen or more debates which feature paramount scholars of both sides: one who scoffs at the idea of the existence of a deity, against one who proclaims that at least One must exist. I openly admit that while I am decidedly a resident in the former camp, I have been impressed, on rare occasion, by the argumentation style--and, every once in a while, the content--of the faithful. Most often, debates of this manner seem to generate questions about the origin of the universe, each side asking the other how it is that they conceive of that pivotal moment, and demanding that his opponent prove the case or face falsification; the religious man questions the atheist's lack of a conclusive evidence and classifies his dismissal of divine influence as its own sort of leap of faith, whereas the atheist disregards the religious man's devotion as blind, unsubstantiated, or hypocritical. And reliably so. I do not recall seeing a debate over this issue in which these roles were not filled, and although the rhetorical style sometimes morphs and the quips are nuanced, the skeleton is recognizable. I therefore aim to break with the tradition a bit, to borrow a strain from Cartesian soliloquy, and to pose to the pious man the following thought experiment.

Let us presume that you are correct, and that some divine entity is responsible for authoring and generating the universe, or life on the Earth, or life in general, or any other iteration of "existence" that you wish to assert. I still perceive an extraordinary leap in the suggestion that the Being/s that governed this creation is caring, in two senses of the word. First, it seems to me that it is equally likely, considering the evidence of the whole of recorded human history and present condition, that the divine is a twisted and vindictive Thing, and not a loving or nurturing one at all. Second, it seems far more likely still that even if this creating Entity is omniscient and omnipotent, It is very likely apathetic to the result. In other words, I have no problem with conceding that some Designer created everything in existence, because I have no evidence which demonstrates that it either must be so or that it cannot have been so. I concede the point, in order to support an argument that it is entirely irrelevant whether or not we were created or we happened by chance, because this resolution does not answer the actual question behind this point of contention: how does this distinction matter, if it does at all?

I have labored over the issuance of my atheistic proclivity, and while I stand firmly by it, I actually believe that it is a case no more worth arguing from an evidential perspective, than is the case forwarded by the theists. Neither one of us has any irrefutable evidence that the other will agree is cogent and applicable, so I will let it alone as an argument and instead keep it simply as a stance. But just as life sometimes opens a window when it closes a door, so to say, I too will subvert my humble concession by posing what seems to be an even more daunting challenge: demonstrate, you believers in the unsubstantiated, that It is a Being that we should be glad to have around. It seems incomparably clear that this is an impossible task, so let me suggest this resolution: given that we can extract morality from some other construct, and given that we can still discover brilliant meaning in our lives without the divine to justify it, let the argument instead revolve around the consideration paid to religion in social movements, with specific reference to the extension of civil rights and liberties, for this is one truly measurable way in which deity does govern us, whether It exists or not.

I will concede that one explanation for the origin of the universe might be that some omnipotent being influenced it, to whatever degree. But imagine that you were certain that this is how things happened, that it were somehow provable and verifyable, and that there was nonetheless no holy writ to influence your perception of this being. I wonder if there would be any evidence prove that the diety was a good one, or if there might be evidence to suggest that wickedness or that indifference are at least equally likely. In other words, even with the certain knowledge of the existence of a First Mover, I do not see any evidence to support any inclination whatsoever to worship it any more than fear it, to love it any more than bemoan it. How, I wonder, can you men of faith bear to say that you will think, act, speak, or vote a certain way, which is in keeping with your holy text, when you cannot demonstrate that the holy text reflects a divinity that cares about what you do or that you do at all, to say nothing of whether or not a loving divinity would favor your particular mindset? How can you further suggest that acting in a way that is in keeping with a so-called holy writ, which is in some cases a centuries-old copiously-translated highly-edited text, resembles anything like what it is to act the way that the divine would wish, having already made the tremendous assumption that one exists? How can you know that you have the right god/s, how can you know that you have the right guidelines, and how can you know that you are reading them the correct way? 

And ultimately, what if there is no Creator, Governor, Mover? Surely we must take this to mean nothing, in the end, because the alternative would be that we all give up the lives we have so welcomed until now; this is no alternative at all. These are the important questions, I think--the ones which reflect the human decisions and understandings, not the sanctified ones. I assert that these are the meaningful intellectual pursuits in part because, as they are designed to be posited to other humans, they are answerable, even--and especially--with the admission of ignorance. Furthermore, I believe that these are the important questions to ask because the answers to them reveal the way that we each apply whatever opinion we have about holy writ, divine existence, and the ontological question. It is the application which is truly important, not just our respective opinions, or just the actual fact of the matter, because it is not some objective Truth which governs the way we act: at least, this must be true, or else this entire debate is moot in the first place. And what use can there be for debate answers which have no hope for verification; much better to concede one side or the other and to reorient the questioning, especially since the outcome of either answer to the God question is necessarily the same.

Morality in the Modern Communitarian Archetype

The thrust of communitarianism, as I understand it, is the assessment that we are no longer a nation-wide community, but rather we identify more closely with smaller communities based on some shared human quality, such as an ethical standpoint, pop culture appetite, linguistic distinction, and so on. Although the idea for this entry finds its genesis in a plenary session given by Michael Daxner, I have heard an identical sentiment very often in the States, and in a disturbingly increasing frequency: one man has no right to judge another, at least in part because the first does not and cannot know the circumstances of the other. I assume that in order to give the argument another figment of support, there is a tangential assertion that it is not proper or suitable for one person to judge another because that is not the charge of humans within a community or between communities. Neither of these claims holds any logical weight, not least of all because the people who hold the belief are necessarily all-purpose dunces, and I will seek to dissolve both of them with stark and abrasive force. Daxner raised several brilliant points, well-measured and finely conceived, which linked the idea of communitarianism to the practice of civil disobedience, examined the nature of morality as rooted in our self-consciousness, and then constructed a framework by which we could evaluate the legitimacy of a world court. Ubiquitous in his lecture were the themes of membership, responsibility, and judgement, which will likewise be echoed throughout this reflection.

One of the vicious dangers of communitarianism is that a system of checks is rendered execrable and, in some way, an unwelcome moral imposition. If communities are allowed to establish their own versions of morality and of law, two constructs whose differences I will attempt to outline presently, then it would be difficult to moderate which system of thought prevails in a community, and to determine how efficient and fair is that mode of action which punishes infractions. Indeed this is the crux of communitarianism, which forces a clumsy respect between communities, and more, a tacit permission for each to govern itself, based on internal laws and customs. This concept seems to be grossly incomplete, in two major ways, which confound the mind for their ignorance of the inclusions requisite to complex societies. First, communitarianism fails to acknowledge, and indeed plainly rejects the possibility of objective morality, even in cases which relate to basic efficiency. Secondly, because of the difficulty inherent in defining the boundaries--and thus the constituents--of a given community, communitarianism is a riddle whose amorphism augments the grasp of the powerful and striates the necks of the meek. It seems that if a community is defined too broadly, that is, if a community is based on something so broad as racial background but then contains several different and oppositional political ideologies, it would be impossible for every group to feel as if has a stake in leadership; the opportunity for alienation and subjugation based on ideological disagreement is obviously present, and given the non-interventionism implicit in communitarianism, that subjugation would have to be addressed internally. In simpler words, for all the cultural safety and heterogeneity that communitarianism provides, it likewise confounds the effort to assure intra-communal equality. Objectivism thus destroyed and disregarded, control is also lost, and balance is become dust.

Global Citizenship as a Misnomer

One of the principle pursuits of the ISP sessions is to establish a groundwork for the term global citizenship. We use the phrase constantly, because a chief concern of the programs run by the Seminar in general is to conceive of a way to work towards a more frequent and dependable paradigm of conversation and collaboration between international scholars. I suppose the theory behind the importance of defining global citizenship is two-fold. In the first place, if we are aimed at revolutionizing the isolationist, elitist attitude that is sometimes prevalent in Western countries, it is prudent to recognize and give a framework to the idea that we each of us share a great deal in common, by virtue of the fact that the reality of a nation-state being an autonomous agent is absolutely void. The extent of the connection between each of our countries is so extraordinary that to qualify it even as a connection misses the point: we are interwoven, in policy and in action, laced together in such a way that the heartbeat of one fuels the arteries of many. Second, to suggest that something like global citizenship exists is to correctly identify our residence on the planet, a conception of self which is not commonly at the forefront. It sets aside nationalism as a defining stripe of identity, and instead repositions the human at the center of a world in which each of his actions spiderwebs out from his fingertips, tugging and nudging at the lives of everyone who he will never meet, all of their options constricted by his choices.

The first manner in which establishing a definition is important, is simultaneously the chief downfall of most of the definitions I have heard so far. It seems to me that a great many thoughts in the academic sphere are reactionary, in that they aim to correct a specific problem which has arisen, usually in the face of declarations that it would arise in the first place. The response to new challenges such as these is often very bold and sometimes fairly aggressive, which needlessly echoes the understandable frustration felt by many of the contributors to the solution. For example, I have heard several advanced faculty suggest solutions which immediately seem unworkable, but which nonetheless highlight the point that some sort of change is dire. Furthermore, many of the suggestions that some visiting scholars have voiced truly reveal the disconnect between the work that they do behind closed oaken doors, and the results that occur in the classroom; the schism between what university faculty imagine that we are thinking, and what--indeed, how--we are actually thinking; the divide between what they believe is meaningful, and the reality that each student faces about what is actually practical and desired by the people who will eventually employ us.

Asked what sorts of elements comprise global citizenship, faculty tend to give answers that are in some way disheartening, because I never see anything that impresses me as being transformative. Appreciation and recognition of the value of other cultures, I have seen. Learning another language: there it is, on the board. Study abroad experience, yes. Ability to identify with the struggles of other classes, creeds, and races. Yes, yes. Yes, there they are, scattered across the graph paper board like a cluttered desk drawer of old newspaper rubber bands. And each certainly a valuable part of cross-cultural understanding, or international competency, or cosmopolitanism, some other term packed tight with buzzwords; each, though, being a definition which must be conceived as independent from global citizenship, because for all their merit, they do nothing to address the pressing concern that each of us faces as a citizen of the globe. In some way, these suggestions underscore the frustrations I have about the identities which many people hold dear. Instead of jumbling together the terms which we believe are germane to a functional, savvy world traveler--skills which no doubt have their place in a person who considers himself to be a global citizen--it is absolutely crucial that we exercise tremendous acuity in imagining each separate definition, lest the functionality of one of the terms--indeed, the utility of the term, because we would lose the ability to charge people with it, and to render them dutiful--should fall away, because its meaning is muddled.

I believe we can extrapolate the identity of a global citizen by thinking first about what it means to be a citizen of any country. Legally, the issue is senseless to argue, because there is no mitigating situation that would prevent someone from being a citizen of the globe; we can rule out all concept of legal standing. I can understand that when a person is raised in a country, he might be indoctrinated with the values of that country, either tacitly or overtly, and that in some way this is unavoidable. Furthermore, it seems to me that in the extreme majority of cases, there is engendered in a person some connection between himself and his land, such that a triumph or a disaster there would be taken as personally as if it had happened to him directly. This is the internal agent of nationalism, that one feels so much a part of his country that the land and the landmarks are extensions of the body. In this way, it is in the soil of identity that citizenship plants its feet, rooting itself in the character of a person yet being sustained by the character of the nation. Thus demonstrated, I would advocate that a weighty part of the definition of global citizenship should reflect this same type of an emotional resonance: a recognition that the world sometimes faces calamity that is somehow intolerable, that it affects a person intimately and meaningfully, and that it becomes of paramount importance to act intentionally to correct the problem. In a very important way, global citizenship is nothing more than taking the globe to be home in the same way that we have traditionally taken nations.

Thus conceived, there are many things that we can infer about how a global citizen must act, and we can delineate the myriad ways that the definitions that have been given by so many scholars are necessary, yet insufficient. In order to keep this essay to a readable length, I will only briefly address some of the most frequent suggestions about what makes up global citizenship, and I will discuss how those fit into the three marginalized terms that I mentioned above. I will also show how it is that those terms are each valuable, but how those ultimately fall short of garnering the solution-oriented mindset that the global citizenship I have defined seems to afford. For the duration of this essay, the idea of global issues or world problems or some such language will be applied, and each of these should be taken to mean some hazard that affects the planet as a body of land on which we all live. In some ways, the definition which I will put forward will be equally workable for solutions to calamities which affect humanity although this is not my express intent, nor do I believe that global citizenship as such should encompass this mode of action. For this type of duty, that is, our responsibility to protect each other and humanity, we might devise some other term, or refer to others which presently exist, such as the ethic of care, a popular tenet of feminist theory and many modern prima facie ethical discussions.

Some of the most commonly suggested terms are perhaps the first to come to academic minds because of their ease to defend, when imagining the sort of world that a mentor would like to create for this pupils. Such suggestions included to build in an emphasis on learning at least one foreign language, participating in study abroad, executing a service project, being able to respect and appreciate other cultures, and possessing a willingness to engage and overcome the differences that one sees between himself and another. These are surely each respectable traits for an individual to have, but they constitute different terms than global citizenship, and if we settle for these as adequate definitions for that term in question, we cheat our way out of rightful ownership of certain universal problems.

In the first place, learning a foreign language does not make a person any more accomplished in the area of addressing a solution that faces the globe. Perhaps a common language would facilitate communication between two parties who engaged a problem together, but increased ease is the only benefit: this commonality would not encourage a certain worldview or additionally persuade a person to be able to address any global problem. It would not be too much to suggest that learning a foreign language might make a person too confident that he is able to identify with the plight or concerns of a people, given that he can already identify with them in some fundamental way. But this presumption would be out of order: it does not follow that two people who are able to communicate with each other are any more likely than any two others to be tightly knit in kinship; look plainly at the existence of civil war to support this fact. It seems absolutely proper to suggest that learning a foreign language is a helpful skill, and even a helpful exercise; but perhaps only in the area of multi-national competence or cultural affinity or something of the sort, because the new skill might spark within a student the passion for travel, or might be taught concurrently with a history course which discussed the country in greater detail. And even if the language is learned with no attention to any other subject, the student is at least able to understand a variety of new texts, navigate a new space, and perform other tasks which might somehow brighten his life. But he is not a global citizen; he is a citizen of more or perhaps two countries, who can trek through either with equal ease, but he does not necessarily care an inch about the rest. Surely, then, he cannot consider himself to be a citizen of the globe any more than he can consider himself to be a lemur.

The misstep of second suggestion echoes that of the first, in the sense that it is simply a physical instance of this tendency towards familiarizing oneself with elements of a foreign culture, and as such, is incomplete. However, just the same as the last example fell short, I cannot see how it is that participation in a study abroad session would necessarily make a student any more than a long-term traveler, which does nothing to demonstrate care about the country which he visits, and none the more for the globe, with which we are more specifically concerned. It is easy to support and prudent to object that traveling to another country would infuse some of that country’s values or tendencies into the traveler, thus making him likelier to be a more socially apt individual; but after all, certainly the opposite might be true. For it cannot be that every student who travels to another country enjoys his experience and internalizes the great truth that cultural diversity is a beautiful occasion of the vibrance of the human appetite. A student abroad is entirely capable, just as any traveler is, of finding something repulsive in the people of the nation he inhabits, and would thus return with a certain distaste for inter-cultural fluency. Notwithstanding, even the best study abroad experience could not ensure that a student would transition from an average collegiate to a global citizen, because travel and cultural savvy do not by themselves constitute, nor would they necessarily engender, a perspective centered around addressing a calamity that faces the world, as if it were just the same as a nation with which he so strongly identified.

Perhaps performing a service project most closely approaches what would count as global citizenship, but only because of the ambiguity of the term. Depending on the aim of the project, service could indeed count as the exercising an act of global citizenship, although it must be service of a certain specific type. It is obvious that ideal service to humankind in whatever form is beneficial to those whom it targets; this is plain to see, and moreover its negation would not serve to disprove the thesis of this essay, so we need not to waste time bickering about whether a particular sort of service is efficient, or whether it cares for the proper people, or any other argument which condemns its practice. In order to count as global citizenship, it seems as if the type of service has obvious constraints: it must act to somehow mend a pressing concern which affects the planet, or it must in other words be aimed at relief of an ailment--such as global warming, oceanic carbonation, overfishing, et al.--which afflicts the physical space of the world, and by implication, our success in it. But the focus must always be external, and founded upon the notion that we must be mindful of the deleterious effect that we constantly exact on a global scale. It is this wording that brings into light a chief concern that I have about generating global citizens, in the sense that I suggest: it seems to be necessarily implicit that if someone cares about the earth itself being in danger, he also cares about human beings being in danger. In other words, it does not seem possible to care about the condition of the earth and nonetheless maintain that humans are not germane to the conversation; it would be difficult to suggest that the planet should exist for its own sake, and that our collective existence should not rightly be considered. However, too liberal of a conception of the notion of care for humankind reduces the composition of a global citizen to the suggest elements which this essay contests; in other words, the notion that service is important serves to highlight the crucial fact that care for humankind is a tangent of global citizenship, but the one does not collapse into the other, nor does the one exist when the other is too prominent.

Two suggestions which sounded incredibly valuable actually carried little weight when constructing a definition of global citizenship, although in another way, they do give global citizenship some meaning. Being able to respect and appreciate other cultures, and possessing a willingness to engage and overcome the differences that one sees between himself and another are certainly relevant to any iteration of talks about two groups of nearly any stripe, but the old objection still holds: these consider relations between people, and miss entirely what seems to be the aim of global citizenship. Instead, as I have suggested already, these cherished characteristics should instead be members of a list of traits which describe ideal peacekeepers, or empathetic diplomats, but surely they are of little consequence when considering our relationship to the planet on which we find ourselves. One sort of term is needed for this interpersonal type of cultivation; quite another is needed to reflect a need for attention to global ailments.

It may be interesting to note here, that much of my conception of a global citizen has a focus which is distinctly reactive, preventative, defensive. This might come from my generally radical approach to how I perceive the world, an attitude which philosophically resembles having constantly to put out fires. Let me then very clearly aim my effort here at ringing the alarm on two distinct fires, thus calling attention to a division which the whole of the conversation about global citizenship seems to miss. There should be one set of terms, along with unique descriptions and goals, for the sort of individual that the conversation about global citizenship has, until now, seemed to describe: a person whom, if we were all a bit more like him, would transmogrify us to a more compassionate, understanding, patient people, and not the least bit xenophobic or ethnocentric. There should be quite another set of terms devoted to the discussion of what it properly means to be a global citizen, that is, a person who considers himself to be a member of the world just as much as he is a member of his nation or his family, and who takes quite seriously any impending misfortune which he can see will befall the planet, with effective respect towards the care for, excellence of, and betterment of humankind.

The persistent theme to be seen in these suggestions is that they are each of them new skills that the educator who mentioned it seeks to instill into his student; or at best, they are passions which the educator believes will make the person more well-rounded, capable of creating a better world. Each of these is probably a fair position to hold, but it no further demonstrates the definition of what it means to be a global citizen, because these oft-mentioned traits only misappropriate the term under examination. The error they encounter is that they each circumvent the crux of the simple language, which can perhaps be understood just a bit better if it is phrased differently: we must ask ourselves, what does it mean to be a citizen, and then, to make the debated definition a practical one, how is it that a citizen of the globe itself would react to a global hazard, given what we know about what it is to be a citizen. In this way, we establish first a definition and then a test, the latter acting as sort of a metric for the former, and each further validated because the other is logically taut and pragmatic. After all, it is unreasonable for us to expect to solve for ourselves the great calamities which now clearly face both our globe and our race, if we neglect to establish a language which properly directs those who are charged with solving such problems.

A New Approach to History

The Friends Committee on National Legislation, a new group whose purpose is to lobby to President Obama, has affixed this plaque to the earth in Washington, D.C., a tree which springs from a root of etched marble. I cannot concede that they speak on behalf of many people, but certainly the only world which I can conceive of as sustainable will hold this statement as fundamental to its credo. Indeed, such a world would be the realization of exactly this hope, now only lines in a stone.

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I stand now, for the purposes of this thought experiment, in direct opposition to everything with which I have formed a dear and lasting confederacy. I have, for as long as I can remember, been a tremendous fan of knowledge and its acquisition, truth and its dispensation, argumentation and its merits. But the combative position that philosophers often take towards their challenges is dwarfed in scale and in venom by the posture that seems to have won favor in recent years, one constructed on a platform of blind and brutish force. Surely, the examples are plenty: intelligence failures, addressed by silencing any contrary voice with an inspection, a dismissal, and explosion; shrieking talk show hosts, who hector at the height of their lungs to squelch factual evidence and to confound logical process; nations, who would sooner ambush and detonate than sit and dialogue; an emphasis on picking sides, racing to arms, identifying alliances by declaring an enemy, and none of it anchored on the slightest toehold of pragmatism in the mountainous glyph of humanity. Has it become of us, now, that we learn who it is to hate, and then we do our best to perform the task, lead down the righteous path to warring by only the vitriolic legacy of our ancestry? Must we fight today because we are taught that this is the way that we have fought every day for as long as we choose to remember, right the way up until yesterday? To assay the problem which plagues us today, let us dissect the germ of it with the feared antidote of that whole breed of violent action: a willingness to imagine the contrary.

To begin. During an academic session that was held here in Salzburg, I had the opportunity to discuss several prominent issues in intergovernmental policy and meta-ethics with the visiting scholars from the United States and Europe. Along with the ideas that I had not heard before, mostly concerning the new presidential administration and the role of the United Nations in the new decade, there were foisted several ideas that I had. For whatever reason, I immediately weakened in my interest, and instead of listening as acutely as I habitually do, I began to build my defamation case. Several times, a Fellow mentioned the pride that an ambiguous we should feel for our country, by which was meant either the country of our ancestral origin or the country to which we currently declare our citizenship, or both. I can understand the emotional attachment to a country, but only to the extent that we admire some bit of the environment or the culture or the history of a people. It cannot be said, after all, that a person have love for a country, but only for a way or a state of being that used to be common to that country. There was also a great deal of talk about the tragedies of the past and the hope we have for the future, all laden with a tiresome amount of self-affirmation. The linguistic key that it is important to recognize here is that, in cases of prudent assertion of one's sovereignty, it must be the case that there is a force which is doing some subjugating; otherwise, this sort of presentation is either empty, as it is not the result of any actual strife, or it is trivial, as the preening would necessarily fall on prejudiced ears. But who, among this group of highly-educated professional intellectuals who reside in the United States, is being kept down? It is my postulate that these assertions of self are in fact by proxy: the speaker who laments his condition to you is very often a surrogate for the cries of his ancestors.

Before continuing, it should be made clear that there is no reason to believe that even the most privileged among us has not at some point suffered the burn of stigmatization. It should not be inferred by these past few paragraphs that it is improper to feel sympathy or remorse for calamities of the past. These feelings certainly perform some sort of social function, such that we are each of us reminded that the empathy we feel for others is a symptom of our shared nature: that an infraction of one man against the rights or person of another is a slight against his own potential and character. In an ideal society, one could imagine that a high and stable degree of this kind of empathy would be a fundamental practice in the elimination of social injustice, but certainly exaggeration should be left out: it is tempting imagine that a heavy percentage of the people who bemoan the way things are actually mean the way things have been. That sort of criticism is certainly important, in its proper context, but the disconnect seen here between intent and actual meaning--or, more precisely, between accurate representation and transposed urgency--is highlighted by one's experience of history. It is intuitively apparent that the retelling of historical atrocities can have a dramatic impression on anyone, and most certainly on one who has some sort of kinship with the affected group. It is not too much of a stretch too assume that a recollection of the 1960s civil rights movement in the United States, for example, would shape the attitude of a young philosopher of any race, or would impress a heavy sense of inheritance upon black and white students in particular. But this is the very issue which strums a dissonant chord: if a historical account stirs the vigor within a person, is it too much to assume that the resultant mind is not preferable? How many agents of cruelty and discord have themselves been avid students of the worst lessons of history, impassioned and fueled forth by the venom they internalized from the story? And worse, how many have we created, who now seek their own version of reconciliation?

This is the inspiration for a thought experiment regarding the import of teaching history as a text instead of extracting only its lesson. Let us take first the common paradigm, which is to instruct students in institutions of learning from the time they are very young until they graduate with their final degree, about the events of history. Very often, the emphasis of these classes is placed on huge reactions, stark developments, prominent and influential people; categorically, the most lasting impression, and very likely the extreme bulk of the instruction, seems to revolve around clashes between two or more ideologies, and the resultant heroism of one party or another. But what about the villain of the story? Surely every hero needs a nemesis to make his struggle possible. The fight between the two has lead us to our condition today, and generally speaking, it seems that the majority seem to be thankful for the dedication and the perseverance of the victor. But a genealogy remains. I have many strains of Celtic ancestry. This very likely means that my people were tortured and killed by the British, or, having escaped that rule, were persecuted, although less vehemently, in the United States. If not, then perhaps they were more affluent, and thus the necessary benefactors of the lucrative practice of slavery, economic brutality, and international wars. Taken too much to heart, either version of that history paints a clear tormentor and a clear sufferer.

I can understand the appeal of having a history, which I will elucidate briefly in an effort to quell the critics I am certain to have built by this point. The extra-experiential ownership of history, that is, the internalization of strife from the past, has its merits. It establishes a sense of belonging, both in the sense of creating an idea of self in the context of a tremendous narrative, and in the sense that it gives a person a feeling of membership to a community which identifies with the same challenges, the same ills, the same triumphs. Further than a casual belonging, a knowledge of history produces in the learner a change to intuit intentionality, of causality. In other words, once some major historical tension and victory is understood, a man can better understand how he it is that he came to be, and thus how it is the he is a product of both the terror and the brilliance innate in the human potential. This understanding is crucial, provided that he is in turn a cog in the giant machine which will irrevocably produce, indeed in some ways determine, the future. In this way, history is an explanation, in addition to being a recollection. If things are bad, they demonstrate the why and the how, which is their link to self-affirmation: one may say--Look at how we have suffered, and yet are now so strong! If things are good, history might demonstrate the transition from poverty to sovereignty, which fosters what I will call achievement complex; or it may demonstrate the same state of good fortune and maintenance, which fosters I will call entitlement complex. History also provides context, by examining the relationship between one group and another, but this facet can be a burden as often as it can be a perk. It seems that a constant and biased re-telling of one kind of relationship has the power to subjugate or embolden the group which hears the story, to shame them or to revivify them: each of these stimuli has its social utility, but surely not a one of them serves to quell tension between two historically combative groups.

Additionally, history as an inheritance establishes an emotional connection to a sort of family narrative, which is disrupted only at the tremendous objection of those who enjoy the comfort provided by this kind of ownership. Inherent in this attitude is the idea that if the past is not retold, it will be forgotten, and the "family" to which each of us belongs would lose significance. There also seems to be pressure from the community of elders to continue some sort of tradition, by custom or by speech, or even by upholding an enduring type of relationship with each different social group. By way of this pressure, there is a tacit acceptance that it is the duty of the next generation to inherit the problems and the solutions of the last. Retelling, then, is a manner of defense of ancestry as much as it is a remembrance: a way to ensure that the fight happened for a reason, not just a commemoration that it happened. But this leap seems to miss the mark a bit. For reasons that will be outlined in the next section, it is feasible to suggest an alternative method of approaching reconciliation that does not include retelling history per se; this model will exclude the story of the embittered struggle, and will demonstrate the way in which animosity can easily fall away. Here, defectors to my upcoming proposition may issue the retort that language presents an exception which seems to fit this function as well, but that language is indispensable from complex society. This objection is respected and accounted, and is probably one of many. But it is easy to demonstrate the way in which language has an independent utility in the way that memories do not. Language allows for more rapid communication of thoughts, which have an equal capacity to praise or to condemn: to create as much good as evil. However, language also permits art, enables cooperation and cohesion, and promotes an ethic of care in the way that memories alone fail to do so. This test is repeatable against other exceptions which may be presented against the following argument.

I cannot understand the import of studying the story itself as it relates to some of the more serious human problems facing each of us today, including inter-class, -creed, -national, and -racial warfare. It is demonstrated that history has its value, but let us for a moment pretend that an institutionalized teaching of the subject was eliminated. Let us suppose further that stories about specific historic strife, with names and faces and alliances, are not told even in the most private of circles. Certainly there is no chance that this experiment could ever be implemented--nor would anyone, I think, suggest that it should--but let us postpone these objections for a moment and imagine that they were, in order to demonstrate the true point of this essay. If each of us is raised without an idea of the historical incongruity of race in the United States, for example, how could there be any animosity between the two races today? And in order to ensure that we do not repeat the injustices of the past, or to counter the theoretical predisposition that a person has to commit such injustices, we must instead simply teach the lesson that we have rightly learned, borne of tragedy.

This is the way to honor the battles of our ancestors. Instead of underscoring the importance of treating each other with respect or governing based on equality by relating the story of Antoine Condorcet or Rosa Parks, simply demonstrate the validity of those lessons a priori. Leave behind tussles between elites which restrict the rights of the public and who battle for power while ignoring the common man; but read the writings of John Stuart Mill and Henry David Thoreau, who have it figured out. We do not need to retell the story of a genocide in order to condemn all genocide, just as we do not need to have experienced falling on a sword in order to appreciate the tremendous pain. Some things are demonstrable, prima facie rights or protections, and an example of their denial does not further prove the case. Anecdotes are good for illustrations, but they might as well be fictitious enough to avoid spawning animosity, for what good is the lesson imparted if the heart is made so callous that the ears ignore a message? A retelling of history opens anew the opportunity to internalize either hatred or shame, which have no part to play in repairing the conflicts that have lasted for so long. A thought experiment works as well as a cultural immersion, if the truth is sound and its speaker is artful. It requires a change in the model we use for learning, and an alteration in our attitude both as students and as teachers. But the merit of this approach to history, while virtually unimplementable, seems to cripple the ability of one group to inherit hate for another, and may go a long way towards humanity's capacity to learn to hate based on group identity.